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ABsTRacT
Many sociologists have argued that work no longer plays the central role in contemporary life 
experience because we have entered an age of insecurity in relation to employment, and knowl-
edge workers are often pictured as egoistical portfolio workers who are only interested in their 
careers and no longer loyal to their employers. Cappelli (1999) on the other hand argues that 
more insecure employment relations is a result of employers’ strategy to buy workers rather than 
offering them long-term relations. 
Using case studies from seven different knowledge work contexts in Norway, this article argues 
that more temporary employment relations is not the result of career-seeking portfolio workers, 
but of changes in employment practices of their employers. These are not primarily changes in the 
formal employment contracts from permanent to temporary employment, but in the social con-
tracts as they are practiced by the employers and experienced by the knowledge workers in the 
different contexts of knowledge work. The reason for more temporary relations was not because 
work does not matter for knowledge workers. On the contrary, we found that they accepted inse-
cure conditions because work mattered and because they were eager to take on new tasks, learn 
the trade in new fields, and show that they were able to do the job. When they left their employer, 
it was because they were not able to do a good job in their positions or because they were increas-
ingly directly exposed to an insecure market that signaled that they were not profitable (enough) 
for their employer. Although changes in employment practices by the employers toward more 
short-term relations are not caused by disloyal portfolio workers, these practices may produce the 
problem of disloyal workers who have to secure their employment in the labor market. 
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Introduction
Many sociologists have argued that work no longer plays the central role in con-temporary life experience because we have entered an age of insecurity in rela-tion to employment (Beck 2000; Sennett 2004). This insecurity in employment 
is claimed to have consequences for the social and personal lives of workers leading to 
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individualization, undermining the work ethic and work as the central basis for people’s 
identities (Beck 2002). While most attention has been paid to flexibilization and the 
erosion of permanent employment relations for workers in manual trades and services 
(Castells 1996; Elliot & Atkinson 1998; Standing 2009), we also find more insecurity 
about employment among knowledge workers (Baldry et al. 2007; Brown & Hesketh 
2004; Felstead et al. 1998). For knowledge workers, however, work is still understood 
as central for their identity because they have invested time and effort in many years of 
education (Alvesson 2000). Although work is seen to matter for knowledge workers, in 
the literature on knowledge work they are often pictured as individual economic agents 
seeking to profit from their investment in qualifications. The image of portfolio workers 
who are only interested in their careers and no longer loyal to their employers illustrates 
this (e.g., Handy 1989). 
In a similar vein, Drucker (1993) has argued that knowledge has become the new 
‘capital’ taking over from the factories and machines of industrial society, and that this 
fundamentally changes the power relation between knowledge workers and their em-
ployers in favor of the workers (see also Donnelly 2009, p. 324). The argument is that 
when the capital, knowledge, is the property of the workers, located ‘in their heads,’ 
they may walk away with their knowledge to another employer who offers them a bet-
ter deal. Following Drucker’s argument, employers are therefore in danger of becoming 
the victims of knowledge workers (or capital bearers) who are no longer loyal to their 
employer, but follow their personal interests and careers. 
Cappelli (1999) argues that more flexible employment relations are the result of 
employers answering to the demands of profitability in a competitive market for knowl-
edge-intensive products and services. Changes in markets, technology, and the drive 
for innovation put pressure on organizations to access cutting-edge knowledge. To do 
this, companies increasingly ‘buy’ this knowledge within the labor market rather than 
develop the necessary knowledge in the organization by investing in their employees in 
a long-term perspective. The result is a ‘new deal at work,’ where the companies offer 
challenging tasks and professional development, but no long-term employment. It is 
then up to the knowledge worker’s efforts to survive in the company and sustain their 
own career (Cappelli 1999). The main benefit from employment of the new deal is an 
attractive CV and the advantage that this brings in the job market (Kunda & Ailon-
Souday 2004). 
Increased turnover and mobility in knowledge work organizations are used as evi-
dence for both types of argument. Whether an individualized career orientation is a con-
sequence of insecure employment relations or an argument for short-term relations for 
the firms, the discourses about knowledge workers as disloyal portfolio workers posit 
the knowledge workers as individual economic actors in a labor market where their 
individual interests in increasing their market value is the central driving force. Since the 
current debate on knowledge work is dominated by business and management scholars 
(Darr & Warhurst 2008), this is not unexpected. Work as an intrinsic value and the 
workplace as a collective arena of production, central to the identity of the knowledge 
workers, is not the focus in this understanding of knowledge workers.
Doherty (2009) challenges the view of the end of work as identity. In a study of 
workers in four large organizations in Britain, he found that work fulfilled important 
personal and social needs for all types of workers, and that the workplace remained an 
important arena for social relations. Following his argument, this article argues that 
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the weakening of ties between knowledge workers and their employers manifest in 
increased turnover is not the result of career-seeking portfolio workers, but of changes 
in the employment practices of their employers. These are not primarily changes in the 
formal employment contracts from permanent to temporary employment, but in the 
social contracts as they are practiced by the employers and experienced by the know-
ledge workers in the different contexts of knowledge work. In this article, we will show 
that the reason for more temporary relations is not because work does not matter for 
knowledge workers. On the contrary, we found that they accepted insecure conditions 
because work mattered and because they were eager to take on new tasks, learn the 
trade in new fields, and show that they were able to do the job. When they left their 
employer, it was because they were not able to do a good job in their positions or 
because they were increasingly directly exposed to an insecure market that signaled that 
they were not profitable (enough) for their employer. 
employment relations in knowledge work
The discourses about employment relations in knowledge work that we have described 
have very different conceptions of power relations between knowledge workers and 
their employers. In Drucker’s (1993) description, the knowledge workers have become 
the most powerful part in these relations since they control the most important means 
of production, the ‘knowledge capital’. This is also the case in the discourses of career-
seeking portfolio workers (Handy 1989). Cappelli (1999) describes a more contingent 
situation where a new deal will leave knowledge workers with less secure employment 
and with individual responsibility for their employability, their power in relation to their 
employer being dependent upon their situation in the labor market. 
Cappelli’s (1999) description of a new deal is mainly based on the development 
of employment relations in the US and therefore is not directly transferable to other 
national contexts. Although the regulation of labor contracts in Europe has been ac-
commodated to more flexible forms of employment (Beck 2000), there are important 
national differences. In contrast to most other countries, the demand from employers 
in the 1990s for greater flexibility in employment contracts was not met by Norwegian 
authorities, and in 1995 the use of short-term or temporary employment contracts was 
restricted by law. The norm in Norway is therefore one of permanent contracts for all 
employees (see Olsen & Kalleberg 2004)1. We would therefore not expect the same 
development toward flexible employment relations in Norway as in the US. Whether 
deregulation to accommodate more flexible employment relations has actually led to 
more short-term employment has also been contested, and the EU’s employment sta-
tistics show that the rate of long-term employment increased rather than decreased 
through the 1990s (Doogan 2005). This indicates that employers are interested in long-
term employment relations and that employment relations are dependent not only upon 
institutional contexts but also upon the economy and the labor market situation. In 
Norway, there is a very high participation in the labor market; 77% of the women 
and 85% of the men work (Kitterød & Rønsen 2010). In a situation of growth in the 
economy, this has resulted in a scarcity of many types of professionals like university 
graduates in engineering, computer science, and economics – the type of workers who 
are covered by our research. We might expect that these employees would use the labor 
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market to negotiate better jobs and conditions at work and certainly not expect that em-
ployers will introduce more short-term and less permanent employment relations with 
scarce groups of highly qualified knowledge workers, but rather that they will invest in 
them and try to keep them in the organization.
social contracts at work 
Changes in employment relations, as to the terms and duration of the relationship, are 
not limited to changes in formal employment contracts, but may also be found in the 
practices and the expectations of employers and workers concerning the time perspec-
tive of their relationship. These may again be a result of the discourses of portfolio 
workers and of practices of increased mobility among knowledge workers, creating an 
expectation that they should move to a new employer within a certain period. It may 
also be a result of a wider scope of insecurity at the societal level as a result of mergers 
and acquisitions and financial crises that have created an understanding of insecurity or 
a manufactured insecurity (Doogan 2001).
Such changes in employers’ and workers’ expectations about the time perspective 
and terms of their relationship change the psychological or social contract at work 
(Rousseau 1995; Schein 1985). The social contract, or the unwritten agreement regard-
ing the relationship between workers and the organization, is shaped by the promises 
and practices of the organization. Social contracts are important in organizational life 
because people’s commitment to an agreement make their actions predictable (Rous-
seau 1995). According to the principle of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960), there should be 
a balance between the demands that the organization places on the workers and the 
rewards that they may in turn expect from the organization. When the different parties 
agree on the terms and follow them, the social contract is reinforced. It may be broken, 
however, when the principle of reciprocity is violated because the balance is disturbed 
(Rousseau 1995). 
The balance between efforts and rewards will vary depending upon whether the 
employment relation is a long-term or a short-term market transaction. When workers 
are being asked for extra effort and to suppress their personal needs for the good of the 
company, this makes sense in a long-term relationship where rewards may follow later. 
Delayed gratification, however, presupposes a long-term relationship where loyalty and 
effort are rewarded. In a short-term relationship, it is not possible to work for delayed 
gratification and it makes no sense to be loyal to an employer who only offers temporary 
employment (Sennett 1998). 
In order to understand specific workplace relations, we need to study the local 
institutional and market situations that shape the work situations of knowledge workers 
(Barley & Kunda 2001; Darr & Warhurst 2008). Private firms employing knowledge 
workers are dependent upon the market for their products and services, and their mar-
ket situation influences the employment relations and opportunities of workers (Cour-
passon 2000; Robertson & Swan 2004; Scarborough 1999). In delivering products and 
services to customers, knowledge workers’ relations with their employer are mediated 
through the markets and the relation with the customers.
Knowledge work is neither a well-defined nor a uniform category (Warhurst & 
Thompson 2006). We follow Scarborough’s (1999) defining characteristic of knowledge 
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workers as workers who engage in knowledge work rather than an occupational defini-
tion. We define knowledge workers as employees who use their specialized knowledge and 
qualifications acquired through education and experience and make use of nonstandard 
solutions to their tasks (Alvesson 2004). Furthermore, in our cases, they solve problems 
and develop solutions for customers in the employment of an organization, selling their 
services in the market (Scarborough 1999). Knowledge workers are employed because 
of their expert knowledge and consequently expect autonomy and self-determination 
at work (Alvesson 2000, 2004; Barron et al. 2001). This is reinforced by adhocratic 
(Mintzberg 1979) or ‘postbureaucratic’ forms of organization, where the responsibility 
for results is devolved to teams of workers (Newell et al. 2002). In return, autonomous 
workers who have their work as a central interest in life are willing to work long hours 
(Deetz 1995). According to Alvesson (2000), high intrinsic work motivation is not the 
only reason why many knowledge workers work long hours. He argues that their work 
effort can also be understood within the perspective of their identity as knowledge work-
ers. Alvesson therefore characterizes knowledge-intensive workers as the ideal subordi-
nates and the employer’s dream in terms of work motivation and compliance because so 
many work hard without supervision from the management (Alvesson 2000, p. 1104). 
A more critical interpretation of long hours culture among knowledge workers is that 
working long hours is necessary to meet performance targets and deadlines for delivering 
projects and required if they want to have a career in the organization (Baldry et al. 2007; 
Epstein et al. 1999; Halrynjo 2007; Voss-Dahm 2005). 
Even if they are motivated by their work and willing to work hard and long hours 
to deliver good quality projects and meet deadlines, the loyalty and commitment of 
knowledge workers are dependent upon the organization honoring their side of the 
bargain, offering them interesting tasks and opportunities for professional development. 
Knowledge workers’ efforts are decided by what they consider fair and reasonable to 
be expected from them as knowledge workers, and if it is no longer a balanced deal 
(Gouldner 1960; Rousseau 1995), they may leave if they have other options, an action 
that their employer in turn may understand as the action of a portfolio worker. 
In this article, we are interested in the time perspective of employment relations 
and the balance between what knowledge workers are offered and their obligations, as 
well as their opportunities to influence their work and working conditions. Whether the 
balance between efforts and rewards is seen as fair or not may explain why they stay or 
leave the organization. Our main question is whether increased mobility in our cases is 
a result of egoistic career-seeking portfolio workers or of new employment policies and 
strategies in the organizations that employ them, conditions that do not allow them the 
opportunity to do a good job. 
data
Qualitative studies allow us an understanding of how work processes and workplace 
relations have an impact upon the opportunities and well-being of workers and their 
satis faction with their employment, i.e., whether they want to stay or to leave the 
organization. To answer the question of if and why knowledge workers leave their 
employers, we use data from seven knowledge work contexts that were collected in two 
consecutive qualitative studies of the organization of knowledge work. The first project 
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(“Boundless work and greedy organisations”)2 studied workers in the ‘new economy’ 
with long hour cultures and high turnover, who were the type of workers sustaining 
the idea of portfolio workers. We collected data from financial workers in a regional 
finance institution, from web designers and programmers employed in different (and 
continually changing) advertising agencies and from systems developers of web-based 
IT systems in a new collectively owned IT firm. 
In the financial institution and the IT firm, we observed the employees in their daily 
work, participated in internal meetings and seminars, and took part in coffee breaks and 
social gatherings. We conducted in-depth interviews (of approximately 90 minutes) with 
strategic samples of workers differentiated by position, qualification, gender, and experi-
ence. We also interviewed managers and key informants and consulted written material 
and previous studies of the organizations. The web designers worked in different orga-
nizations when we interviewed them. They had, however, worked for shorter periods in 
the same organizations and were recruited using the ‘snow-ball’ method of sampling. 
Some of them we interviewed in their workplace, but since this was not always possible 
and because some of them were on their way out of the company, they were interviewed 
in cafés or hotel rooms. 
Since two of the contexts, web design and the IT firm, were newly established busi-
nesses without any perspective of long-term relations with their employees, we became 
interested in how knowledge work organizations that depend upon long-term and stable 
employment relations managed to be competitive in a dynamic and changing market. 
In the next project (“From permanent relations to casual flings?”)3, we therefore chose 
in-depth studies of departments of well-established large organizations that developed 
flexible organization structures (postbureaucratic forms of organization) to meet the 
demands from a turbulent market (Kanter 1989). In this project, we studied workers 
in research and development within two departments of a large international private 
research institution and a research laboratory of a large international industrial com-
pany. We also studied a public relations agency that delivered knowledge-based services 
on a commercial basis. We used the same design as in the first project with observation 
and participation in seminars, meetings, and social gatherings and long interviews with 
strategic samples of workers as well as managers and key informants in each research 
site. In two of the research departments, we also used focus groups. We made field notes 
during our observations and all interviews and focus group discussions were digitally 
recorded and transcribed verbatim. In each case, we interviewed about 10–11 employees 
and 1 or 2 operational managers. 
We presented our findings in the organization where this was possible in both pro-
jects. In five of the organizations, masters students participated in the data collection and 
wrote a thesis based on their cases.
Our definition of knowledge workers as workers who do knowledge work (Scar-
borough 1999), irrespective of their level of formal education, resulted in a very varied 
group of workers. In our case, it includes self-taught web designers and software work-
ers as well as scientists with a doctorate degree. The knowledge workers in our sample 
therefore worked in different types of firms in different market contexts and varied 
considerably according to turnover and mobility. Recognizing these variations, we are 
not aiming at giving an overall picture of employment relations in knowledge work in 
Norway. Instead, we want to understand the practices and processes shaping the dura-
tion of employment relations in our cases.
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We analyzed the data across both projects by reading carefully through all notes 
and transcriptions of each case, analyzing the cases individually and subsequently com-
paring the cases across projects. The comparisons across cases thematically examined 
working conditions (Håpnes & Rasmussen 2008), power relations (Rasmussen 2008), 
and employment relations (this article). The two studies give insight into employment 
relations in different types of knowledge organizations from the ‘new economy’ to tra-
ditional knowledge-producing organizations. We found across the case studies a general 
development toward more insecure and less permanent employment relations. In our 
analysis, we distinguish between four different types of employment relations from very 
short-term to life-long relations. The four types are based on what we found to be rel-
evant distinctions between the practices and interpretations of employment relations in 
the seven cases. The first three are different variations of more transactional types of 
social contracts (Rousseau 1995) or new deals (Cappelli 1999), whereas the fourth is a 
relational contract (Rousseau 1995) or the old deal (Cappelli 1999). The four types, as 
such, are part of our findings, and we use them to highlight key distinctions in the dif-
ferent employment relations in our cases.
We have grouped the cases according to characteristics relevant to the analysis of 
the employment relations, and they will be presented in the following order:
1)   Short-term relations in the dot.com sector: web designers in advertising and a new 
IT company 
2)  ‘On trial’ in the ‘new economy’: financial services and public relations
3)   Dependent upon economic results in research: construction and IT departments of 
an international research institution
4)   Life-long relations in the research laboratory of a large international industrial com-
pany 
dot.com: opportunity knocks
The employment relations that we found in the dot.com sector were very intense, but 
of short duration, often ending in breakup where the employees felt deceived and let 
down by their employer. The relationship started, however, with enthusiasm and strong 
positive emotions on the side of the employees; a lot like falling in love. The dot.com 
companies were relatively new organizations offering young people opportunities to try 
their hand working with web design and web-based IT systems. For many, this was an 
opening into an attractive field where they could participate in the development of new 
products and technology. 
Advertising is traditionally structured according to a strict hierarchy (Alvesson 
1998) and the opportunity for employment as a graphic designer is dependent upon 
having the ‘right’ education. In Norway, this is the private Westerdals school of advertis-
ing to which it is very hard to gain entrance. Since there was no formal education in web 
design when we interviewed, trying their hand as a web designer was a backdoor into 
advertising, offering young people the opportunity to gain experience and build a port-
folio to develop a career as designer. Programming web sites was also a new area, and all 
the programmers were self-taught. Since their motivation was high, it was not a problem 
that there was a culture in the organizations that demanded hard work and long hours 
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to deliver on time. This meant unpaid overtime since the consultants who sold products 
on the web for the advertising agencies did not know the work process and how long it 
took to design the products, and did not ask the web designers.
The willingness of the young men and women to work unpaid hours waned, how-
ever, when the long hours became the rule rather than the exception:
‘It’s like giving someone a ball of wool and saying: “knit a sweater of this. It is to 
be size XL, and if it is not enough wool, that’s your problem”.’ (web designer) 
The agencies were eager to sell their customers new products on the web. This was 
a new and lucrative market. When the workers had to invoice 7 hours work a day 
at £85 there was much to be earned, especially when newly appointed workers were 
paid around £15,500 a year at that time. After being seduced by the opportuni-
ties that the advertising agencies offered, the web designers and programmers felt 
deceived when they experienced that their suggestions as to improving the working 
processes were not followed up, and that they were not treated as professionals, but 
as labor power to make huge profits on web pages for the customers of the agen-
cies. The ultimate betrayal was when management argued that it was not necessary 
to make good designs since their customers wouldn’t know the difference anyway. 
Then the deal was off for the ambitious young designers, and sacrificing family, 
friends, and private life working around the clock was no longer accepted. Thus 
the designers left the agencies to try somewhere else in the hope that they would 
be treated better there. 
The IT firm also offered the opportunity to work with a new technology, and self-
taught and newly educated computer scientists were offered jobs developing web-based 
systems for small firms. They were eager and enthusiastic to work in the frontline of the 
technology and very happy with this opportunity. In return, they were willing to give the 
organization everything to be able “to work with my hobby and even get paid for it,” as 
one of the systems developers in the IT firm said, or
‘The job in itself is so entertaining that there is no point in going home to watch TV. That’s 
boring compared to this. It is turned upside–down. You relax more at work than at home 
in front of the TV.’ (web programmer)
Working in organizations with other young people where the line between work and 
social life was blurred was like a continuation of their life as a student, only paid. 
The new IT firm invariably sold their products very cheaply to gain foothold in the 
market. It experienced turnover when the systems developers no longer accepted the 
pressure of long hours because their employer sold the projects too cheaply. Often 
the firm was not able to pay their wages on time because the customers had not settled 
their accounts. The firm argued that they would all get paid for their efforts when they 
were able to go public and realize the value in the company. The practice of playing 
at business, however, was not compatible with the professional identity of the system 
developers and, at a more practical level, was not compatible with having a family. The 
employees therefore demanded changes and ultimately quit, despite their interesting 
tasks and possible future prospects, because their employer was not able to fulfill their 
part of the deal. 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 2  ❚  Number 1  ❚  February 2012 13
The employees in the dot.com firms therefore experienced short, but very intensive 
employment relations that started out with enthusiasm, but ended with disappointment 
and a feeling of being deceived when they experienced that the relation was one-sided 
and their employers were not willing, or not able, to meet their obligations. The employ-
ees demanded that the companies listened to them and organized their work so that they 
were able to deliver good quality products and meet the deadlines. As an experienced, 
self-taught systems developer in the IT firm voiced it: 
‘(W)e could certainly have managed to play postmodern organization with a flat structure 
for a long time, but to get a serious business off the ground, I think that you have to get 
organized.’ 
When the employers were not willing or able to meet their obligations, the employees 
were frustrated and disillusioned and left. The companies hired inexperienced and eager 
workers, and seduced new recruits when they left. As long as there was a supply of am-
bitious work-hungry young people, willing to accept the hard work and long hours for 
an opportunity to try their hand in the field, they could persist with this strategy. This 
resulted in short-term employment relations that made the firms vulnerable when their 
experienced workers left (Rasmussen & Johansen 2002, 2005). 
Hired ‘on trial’
The jobs in the financial institution and the public relations agency were very at-
tractive for young university graduates. Both were eager to hire the best people and 
presented themselves in the most favorable way for students at leading universities, 
and they had so far been successful. Recruiting was done using elaborate proce-
dures where the candidates were interviewed and tested through ‘real-life’ cases to 
see whether they were suited for the job and had the right attitudes. Those that were 
chosen, however, did not earn a permanent position, but were given ‘the opportunity 
to try their hand at the job,’ with the prospect of a career in the firm. To be chosen 
therefore did not mean a long-term relation. They were hired ‘on condition’; after 
their hiring there followed a ‘trial’ period. This was not, however, the regular trial 
period of 6 months in all employment relations in Norway in which the employer 
may terminate the relationship if there are sound reasons for this, specified in the law, 
but an implicit agreement that they would first have to prove themselves, often in 
competition with other candidates, to gain permanent employment in the organiza-
tion. Since these were potentially attractive positions, the ones who were chosen were 
grateful for this opportunity.
In the public relations agency the positions were called trainees, but to work as a 
trainee did not mean that they learned the business of the organization by a gradual 
period of apprenticeship. The policy of the company was to throw them directly into 
the projects and expect them to produce, “because that was the best way to learn.” 
Since they were on trial, they knew that they had to work hard to show that they were 
good enough to qualify for a permanent position. Success in the organization was 
not only a question of professional qualifications, but also of having the right ‘drive,’ 
being able to shoulder the work, fit in, and market themselves as professionally and 
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economically attractive. It was explicitly stated that if they did not earn enough or 
produce as expected, they would have to find something else. As a result, the recruits 
would work as hard as they could and forsake family and friends. Being recruits and 
inexperienced, they did not know what was good enough and were therefore often 
not able to limit their efforts. Being noticed by leading seniors secured them attrac-
tive projects, but it also meant that they ended up participating in too many projects 
with a too heavy workload. The first years were called boot camp, a good illustra-
tion of the reality for the workers in this period. To show their worth, they worked 
hard to present themselves as able to deliver good quality solutions under pressure. 
It was therefore in the order of the day to end up ‘burnt out.’ When this happened 
they would hear stories from the older and established colleagues about when they 
burnt out, confirming that this was considered a normal thing for trainees. A project 
administrator told us about a colleague who had experienced burn out when they 
were both trainees:
‘When she was off sick, several colleagues came and told me about when they had ended 
up burnt out. I thought, must everyone burn out here?’ 
In spite of an emphasis on teamwork and developing the competence of the workers, in 
the end what counted was the individual economic result as billed and paid hours that 
were demanded by their investors (Håpnes & Rasmussen 2011a). 
In the financial institution, economic results were also what counted. They recruited 
university graduates because they wanted to give better professional advice to their cli-
ents, but it was sales that ultimately counted. A dealer in stocks and bonds who was also 
a macroeconomic analyst told us that she felt that she had to work at the trading table 
when the exchange was open. The short-term gains of trading overruled the long-term 
investment in macroeconomic analysis:
‘The problem is that working for the customers brings income. When trading you can see 
the money coming in by the hour, but analyzing you don’t earn money… In trading every-
body is concerned about earning money. After all, that’s the mark of a good trader.’
Measuring sales on a daily basis, personal qualities of the dealers and their ability to 
create good relations with the customers was more important than professional compe-
tence, according to the analysis of the manager (Rasmussen 2005). 
The finance institution tried out their recruits in different trading jobs. These were 
not jobs that were suited for everyone. Traders used their ‘gut feeling’ to ‘feel’ where the 
market was heading. According to the manager, the ones who thought too much or had 
to analyze the situation did not manage the pressure of trading. Many competent and 
well-qualified recruits therefore had, in the words of their manager, “to be coached out” 
or transferred to other positions in finance or banking. Even for those who did well as 
traders, the job was not seen as a long-term occupation. Their most experienced trader 
had worked as such for 10 years, and that was exceptional. It was expected that the 
traders would either move ‘backstage’ as analysts, to corporate finance, to the mother 
bank, or to one of the large customers. Some of the traders ended up as taxi drivers, 
according to management. The stress of the job made them unsuited for a normal office 
job (Rasmussen 2005). 
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The employees in these organizations could experience a hard time in their trial 
period when they had to show that they were worthy and able to manage their tasks 
and be accepted as competent and profitable workers. Many lost in the competition and 
were counseled out, but the ones who managed to survive and gain a position that gave 
them authority and autonomy at work could look forward to a professional career in 
the organization (Håpnes & Rasmussen 2011a). 
Franchise in research
In the departments of the international research institution, we found a traditional pro-
ject organization where the research scientists, and especially the seniors, were respon-
sible for the development and contracting of new projects. Their market relations were 
based on long-standing professional relationships, often forged when they were students 
at the technical university. Their networks were therefore often personal and the rela-
tions were based on trust in their and the research institutions’ professional standing and 
past successes. However, changes in the relation between the public sector and private 
businesses in Norway inspired by new public management (NPM) led to radical changes 
in the market situation. Under the new NPM regime, public units could no longer con-
tract research projects directly through negotiations with research institutions, but had 
to invite for tenders. The IT research department had for many years collaborated suc-
cessfully with several state departments and public agencies developing cutting-edge 
systems. They had been able to pick and choose among large innovative research pro-
jects. The change posed a serious challenge to them. Where they used to cooperate with 
their user organizations and propose new projects based on their expert knowledge, 
they were now expected to bid for projects defined and specified by agents who were 
not in the front of technological developments. Who won the projects was often more 
a question of price than of scientific quality. Changes in the relations between the R&D 
institutions and the public sector thus threatened the long-standing market relations 
based on trust and professional expertise. In the IT department it meant that young re-
searchers without market relations were pressured to bid for projects in areas that were 
far from their professional expertise. During our data collection, the organization was 
forced to downsize. 
The research institution had already established principles for calculating the 
necessary earnings for individuals and departments. They were based on the cost of 
running of the department, central management and administration, plus reserves. 
Systems for registering and billing hours for the projects generated automatically ac-
count for the earnings of the individual researchers and departments. These were ad-
ministrative systems that kept account of the economic situations of the projects and 
the organization. The changes in the market situation and the new NPM-inspired 
regime, however, changed the function of the traditional accounting systems into a 
performance management system. In the new and insecure situation, central manage-
ment increased their control over the weekly and monthly earnings. At the same time, 
the influence of local and central management over the market decreased. Under the 
threat of a market they were unable to control, managers and researchers alike felt 
they were in the same boat. When ‘the market’ was not willing to pay more for a pro-
ject, this was not easy to challenge. 
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Everybody knew that their employment was dependent upon their being successful 
in the market, and the higher up in the professional hierarchy, the greater the pressure 
to secure money for others as well as themselves. The accounting systems that produced 
the daily, weekly, or monthly results of each employee made success or failure visible 
for everyone. To be without paid projects, even for a short period, was a strain even for 
well-established experts, and failing in the market was always a threat to their position 
in the organization. 
Whereas departments used to be able to offer training in research in their fields 
through working on projects, in the current market situation, they were no longer able 
to accommodate gradual training of their young researchers. They therefore collaborated 
with university faculty to organize PhD positions at the university to give the young 
researchers the opportunity to specialize, publish, and develop their professional net-
works so that they could come back as experts. This was also offered to the young scien-
tists when the IT department had to downsize, as an alternative to leave for employment 
elsewhere. 
The visible daily, weekly, or monthly accounting of each individual’s contribution to 
the organization’s economic results, combined with their insecure market situation, had 
as a consequence that the permanent employment relations in the R&D departments 
changed their meaning. It no longer meant what it used to mean: that their employing 
organization felt responsible for the research scientists and their fields of expertise in 
a long-term perspective. Instead, they were increasingly made individually responsible 
for their professional development, contracting the projects, planning the work, and 
producing the results at the right quality, under the company’s logo. “A sort of fran-
chise relation” as one of the informants called it. The research institution showed more 
concern about the economic results of the departments and less about the professional 
results of their projects.
Life-long employment
Employment in the industrial corporation was characterized by long-term commitment 
from both employer and employees and a promise of an internal career in the organiza-
tion. The precondition for this relation was that the company had a measure of control 
over the market situation making long-term planning possible. This was the only or-
ganization in our sample that kept to the ‘old deal’ and hired workers in a long-term 
perspective, training them in the firm and offering a career for all types of workers. The 
company was large with international subsidiaries and a wide range of activities and 
types of workers. They wanted to be a family-friendly employer and had a policy of hir-
ing women. They were therefore very attractive in the labor market and the employees 
were allowed reduced working hours to better fulfill family obligations without forsak-
ing professional opportunities or management careers (Håpnes & Rasmussen 2011b). 
The company had an active personnel or human resource management function 
where the demands from the project managers in the matrix organization were counter-
balanced by department managers who were responsible for the professional develop-
ment, career, and personal welfare of their workers. Project managers were primarily 
concerned with the needs of their projects and not with the pressure of work for the 
employees or their need for learning and professional development and careers. The 
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 2  ❚  Number 1  ❚  February 2012 17
department manager’s responsibility for human resources was therefore important in 
protecting the workers from participation in too many projects. In this employment 
relation, the company was both ‘father’ and ‘mother’ to the workers, protecting them 
and guiding them toward a successful professional career in the company. The workers 
were in turn grateful for the opportunities and care shown by the company and were 
willing to work hard and take responsibility for the company’s needs (see also Håpnes 
& Rasmussen 2011b). 
The industrial company was, however, increasingly exposed to market forces. They 
had experienced structural changes in the market that made employees redundant. As 
a company that felt responsible for their employees, they had managed this by training 
the people who were redundant for other positions. To prevent further redundancy, the 
company had a policy of keeping the permanent employees below their actual need 
for manpower by contracting out projects to long-term partners and hiring workers 
temporarily on 3-year projects. For workers, these temporary assignments in the good 
company was a welcome opportunity to make themselves visible as interesting workers 
for the company with the hope of securing a permanent position. They felt that they, like 
the trainees described earlier, had to work extra hard and long hours to show themselves 
as attractive and indispensable for the organization in order to gain a position in the 
company (Håpnes & Rasmussen 2011b).
a new deal? 
We asked in this article how we could understand changes in employment relations and 
whether they were caused by powerful portfolio workers or whether work still matters 
and increased turnover was the result of changing employment practices. We found in 
our studies that employment relations were changing, not because of egoistic career-
seeking employees, but because the employees were offered more insecure employment. 
The increased turnover in knowledge organizations in our study was due to new deals 
at work, i.e., changes in the working conditions and social contracts that were offered 
by their employers. Our findings therefore support the argument that increased mobility 
and turnover is a consequence of more insecure and unbalanced employment relations 
(Rousseau 1995; Sennett 1998). 
Could we see a conscious strategy as the new deal that Cappelli (1999) describes? 
We found a conscious strategy of recruitment and selection in the financial institution 
and the public relation agency. Both were actively recruiting at leading universities and 
trained and followed up their recruits, including trying them out and counseling out 
the ones they did not want. This is a relatively new practice in Norway, but one that 
we also find in Brown and Hesketh’s (2004) study of the (mis)management of talent 
in the UK. In the industrial company with life-long permanent employment, we found 
a human resource strategy to protect workers from overwork and secure their profes-
sional development and careers. Part of that strategy was using temporary positions as 
a buffer. Temporary positions in the company were attractive because they might result 
in a permanent position like the case had been for other temporary workers. In general, 
the increased insecurity that we found was less a result of a calculated policy and more 
of the free play of market forces in the daily work situation of the knowledge workers. 
We saw, however, increased central control of economic results in the face of market 
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problems (Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips 2006; Courpasson 2000). This supports Doo-
gan’s argument that the most important environmental factor when it comes to work 
insecurity is the qualitative greater exposure of the workforce to market forces and a 
growing awareness of its instability (Doogan 2001). 
work matters
The ways in which employment relations were changing differed. They were shaped by 
the history, institutional context, and markets of the organizations. The long-term or 
short-term perspective of the firm was most decisive. The dot.coms had a short-term per-
spective dominated by their goal to sell the business or go public and realize the value of 
their efforts in the stock market. The intense, but short employment relationship in the 
dot.com organizations was a result of the seduction of young and eager workers through 
exciting tasks and opportunities in a new field of work. When they realized that they 
were not taken seriously as knowledge workers, not listened to when they suggested 
improvements (Hirschman 1970), and treated like cheap labor power that could be put 
to work days and nights, they felt deceived and left. 
The young graduates in finance and public relations were also attracted by interest-
ing work, attractive colleagues, and organizations with opportunities. After they were 
carefully selected as recruits, they had to demonstrate their value for the firm, often in 
direct competition with each other to win a permanent position. The demands of share-
holders for profit from their investment influenced the public relations agency. Their 
focus on economic results and billable hours undermined the internal training in the 
trial period and led to a market-based short-term employment relation (Håpnes & 
Rasmussen 2011a). In the financial institution, personal and relational qualities turned 
out to be more important than professional competence when short-term sales was the 
measure of success (Rasmussen 2005).
The research institution had traditionally invested in their employees in a long-
term perspective and been a responsible employer, but changes in the market due to 
the introduction of NPM principles in the public sector made this difficult. They were 
no longer able to train the scientists in the departments like they had previously done, 
but had to leave the responsibility for the training to the individual researchers and 
the university. The marketization of the employment relation (Kunda & Ailon-Souday 
2004) also made the research scientists individually responsible for acquiring projects 
and producing results. If their markets failed or they did not succeed in establishing 
themselves in new markets, there was no longer work for them. The research institu-
tion showed less concern about securing their knowledge capital than the economic 
results of their projects. The traditional management of scientists and engineers in 
research and development that Causer and Jones (1996) describes as personalized, 
motivational, and flexible changed toward indirect control through monitoring of 
performance and the introduction of market forces directly. When the market forces 
became more pressing than they had been previously, employment in the research 
institution was no longer such a good deal. The “franchise” relation for the workers 
made it a ‘do-it-yourself job’ where the role of management was being reduced to con-
trol of the economic results at the collective and individual levels (Clegg et al. 2006; 
Courpasson 2000). 
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The industrial company with its life-long marriage had a very long perspective on 
their business and invested in the knowledge of their workers. The organization was 
attractive because it offered interesting jobs and promises of professional development 
and a career in the company. The workers who had secured a permanent position felt 
a strong obligation and were willing to take responsibility for the organization that 
offered them such opportunities. The workers on temporary contracts, however, were 
disciplined to work extra hard and not protest, with a hope of acquiring a permanent 
position in the company.
The turnover and mobility that we found in our studies was therefore not a result 
of profit-seeking portfolio workers, but rather of workers who strongly identified with 
their work, but felt forced to leave. When they left, it was either because it was no longer 
possible to do a good job and they were disillusioned with the company and gave up 
trying to affect changes as in the dot.com sector, or because they were not among those 
chosen for a permanent position and were counseled out in the trial period, or because 
they were no longer able to sell their expertise in the market like we saw in the depart-
ments of the research institution. Their exits were therefore the result of the employment 
practices of their employers and their market situation. 
When the relations between knowledge workers and their employers where they 
worked were changing and we could see signs of what Peter Cappelli (1999) has called 
a new deal at work, this was not because the formal employment contract had changed 
from permanent to temporary (with the exception of the temporary employees in the 
R&D department of the industrial organization), but because the nature of perma-
nent employment for knowledge workers in ordinary permanent jobs had changed. 
The changes were in the practices of employment relations that were developing with 
devolved responsibilities for the results and the market performance to the individual 
knowledge workers. It was therefore the new social contracts as they were practiced by 
the employers and experienced by the employees that changed the employment relations 
in the different contexts of knowledge work that we studied. 
The discourse of egoistic, disloyal portfolio workers (or generation X or Y) is, despite 
the lack of evidence, often used as an explanation for changes in employment relations; that 
relations are changing because firms have to adapt to a new type of workers. In this sense 
the idea of portfolio workers is strong and has effects upon employment relations even if 
empirical studies of knowledge workers and their employers do not confirm this idea. Hav-
ing followed the firms since our data collection (except for the dot.coms that were bought 
by multinationals or went bankrupt), we have observed that the development we found 
toward more insecure employment relations has continued in spite of an increased labor 
shortage of professional workers in the labor market. Marketization of the knowledge 
work organizations and reduced loyalty from the employers toward the knowledge work-
ers may therefore encourage strategic market behavior by employees. When employers are 
only interested in their short-term economic results and no longer loyal to the knowledge 
workers or investing in their ‘knowledge capital,’ the workers with the highest earning ca-
pabilities may be the first to leave for another employer who offers them a better deal, like 
the workers in the dot.com firms. Thereby marketization of the knowledge organizations 
and a perspective on short-term economic gains of the firms may well produce turnover 
and mobility when knowledge workers are in demand in the labor market. In this way the 
introduction of market forces in the management of knowledge workers could produce the 
problem of disloyal portfolio workers, making the idea a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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end note
1  The exception is when a permanent employee is temporarily absent (due to parental leave or 
other types of leave (sick leave, educational leave, etc.)). Because of extensive leave provisions 
in the Norwegian labor law, there are very many Norwegian employees on short-term con-
tracts (Olsen & Kalleberg 2004). 
2  The project (“Grenseløse jobber og grådige organisasjoner”) was financed by the 
Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) and the data collected in 1999 
and 2000.
3  The project (“Fra faste forhold til løse forbindelser”) was financed by the Work-life pro-
gramme of the Norwegian Council for Research (156100) and the data collected in 2003 
and 2004.
